Two States Solution
The Two-State Solution and the Palestinian Question
Few political ideas have been invoked as often — or achieved as little — as the Two-State Solution. For decades, world leaders have proposed dividing the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean into two states — one Jewish, one Palestinian — as the path to peace. Yet every attempt has failed, not only because of disputed borders, but because of deeper questions of intent, identity, and legitimacy.
The Two-State Solution
The Two-State Solution envisions two nations living side by side in peace and security: a Jewish state of Israel and an Arab state of Palestine.
Origins
The concept originated in the UN Partition Plan of 1947 (Resolution 181), which proposed separate Jewish and Arab states with Jerusalem under international control. The Jewish leadership accepted the plan; the Arab League and Palestinian leaders rejected it and launched war against Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948. The war ended with Israel victorious and the Arab side fragmented — leaving no Palestinian state and setting the stage for continuing conflict.
The 1967 Turning Point
In June 1967, following the Arab declaration of intent to destroy Israel, the Six-Day War erupted. Israel preemptively struck and captured the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, Sinai, and Golan Heights. UN Resolution 242 called for “land for peace” — Israel withdrawing from occupied territories in exchange for recognition and security. This formula became the cornerstone of future peace efforts.
Oslo and the Moment of Hope (1993–2000)
The Oslo Accords (1993) established mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Palestinian Authority (PA) was created to govern parts of the West Bank and Gaza, with a framework for final status negotiations. But the process collapsed amid terrorism, Israeli settlement expansion, and political mistrust. The failure of Camp David (2000) and Taba (2001) ended the peace momentum and ignited the Second Intifada.
October 7 and the Death of Illusion
The Hamas massacre of October 7, 2023, in which terrorists murdered and kidnapped Israeli civilians, destroyed what remained of faith in a Two-State vision. For Israelis, it confirmed that any Palestinian state could become another Gaza — a terror base on its border. For Palestinians, Israel’s massive retaliation exposed the strategic bankruptcy of violent “resistance.” The attack turned a fragile diplomatic theory into a political impossibility.
Current Reality (2025)
Today the “Two-State Solution” exists mostly as rhetoric:
The Palestinian Authority is weak and corrupt.
Hamas controls Gaza and rejects coexistence.
Israel’s leadership prioritizes security and normalization with Arab states over territorial withdrawal.
The international community still endorses the formula but with fading conviction.
Many analysts describe the current situation as “one state by default” — Israel governs the territory; Palestinians remain divided and stateless.
Summary
The Two-State Solution remains morally appealing but politically hollow. The obstacle is not geography but mutual intent: Israel once sought coexistence, while much of the Arab world sought exclusion. Until both sides accept **two nations living side by side — not one over the other — peace will remain theoretical.
Critical Questions About a Palestinian State
Calls to “create a Palestinian state” raise fundamental, unanswered questions: Who would create it? Where? Who would govern it? What would its constitution be?
1. Who Would Create It?
Israel controls the territory and security; it would need to agree — politically impossible after October 7.
The Palestinian Authority has no credibility or control.
Hamas rejects Israel’s existence.
The international community can sponsor negotiations but cannot impose sovereignty.
There is currently no legitimate builder of such a state.
2. Where Would It Be Created?
Traditionally: the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as capital. Yet:
The West Bank is fragmented by Israeli settlements.
Gaza is devastated and isolated.
There is no territorial link between the two.
A state formed of these enclaves would be geographically and economically nonviable.
3. Who Would Govern It?
Governance is the fatal flaw.
Hamas can govern but refuses peace.
Fatah favors peace but cannot govern effectively.
Arab states avoid responsibility.
Those who can govern will not make peace; those who might make peace cannot govern.
4. What Kind of Constitution Would It Have?
Drafts of the Palestinian Basic Law (2002–2005) designate:
Islam as the official religion,
Shariʿa as a main source of legislation,
Arabic as the sole official language.
Such a framework raises immediate concerns about religious freedom and democracy, especially under Hamas-style rule.
5. The Underlying Dilemma
Until the Palestinian movement produces a non-militant, non-corrupt leadership that recognizes Israel’s right to exist, a Palestinian state remains a diplomatic slogan — without land, legitimacy, or leadership.
The 1967 Borders Paradox
Modern Arab and Palestinian leaders often demand a “return to the 1967 borders.” Yet in 1967 those same borders were rejected and attacked by the Arab states that launched the Six-Day War.
Before that war:
The West Bank was ruled by Jordan.
Gaza was ruled by Egypt.
No Palestinian state existed, and none was proposed.
The goal of the 1967 Arab coalition was not to restore those lines, but to eliminate Israel entirely. Only after defeat did Arab diplomacy redefine those same borders as “the basis for peace.”
If those borders were truly acceptable, why were they the starting point for a war of annihilation? The answer: the problem was never the borders — it was Israel’s existence.
Why There Was No Palestinian State Between 1948–1967
From 1948 to 1967, Jordan ruled the West Bank and Egypt ruled Gaza. During those 19 years, no Palestinian state was established — revealing that the Arab objective was not statehood but Israel’s destruction.
Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950, granting limited citizenship and banning talk of Palestinian independence.
Egypt controlled Gaza by military rule, denying its residents citizenship or sovereignty.
The PLO, created in 1964 (three years before Israel captured those territories), defined its mission as the liberation of all of Israel, not statehood beside it.
If a Palestinian state was truly desired, it could have been declared then — under full Arab control. It wasn’t, because the goal remained the eradication of Israel, not coexistence.
The Evolution of Palestinian National Identity (Before and After 1967)
The word “Palestinian” has existed for centuries, but its meaning evolved from a geographic term to a political identity only in the late 20th century.
Before 1948: “Palestinian” meant anyone living in the British Mandate — Jews included. Arab leaders said Palestine was “southern Syria,” not a separate nation.
1948–1967: Arab nationalism dominated; Palestinians were considered part of the broader Arab nation.
1964: The PLO was created by the Arab League, defining Palestine as part of the Arab homeland and denying Israel’s legitimacy.
After 1967: Following Israel’s victory, Palestinian nationalism became distinct — shifting from pan-Arabism to Palestinian self-identity, centered on resistance.
1974: The UN recognized the Palestinians as a people with a right to self-determination; the PLO became their official representative.
As historian Benny Morris observed:
“Palestinian nationalism arose not before Zionism, but in response to it.”
Thus, the modern Palestinian identity was forged in reaction — a political identity defined largely by opposition to Israel’s existence.
Public Opinion After October 7: From Celebration to Regret
The October 7 2023 Hamas attack initially brought celebration among many Palestinians who saw it as revenge against occupation. Early polls showed 72 % approval of the attack (PCPSR, Dec 2023).
But as Israel’s response devastated Gaza, opinion shifted. By September 2024, 57 % of Gazans said Hamas’s decision was wrong, citing massive civilian losses and destruction. By 2025, only 31 % said the attack served Palestinian interests.
This shift reflected regret for consequences, not moral opposition to killing civilians. Support eroded because the attack backfired, not because the ideology changed.
Had Israel not responded so forcefully, public approval for October 7 would likely have remained high.
Implications
The Palestinian movement’s moral vocabulary remains shaped by victory and victimhood, not coexistence. Condemnation of violence follows defeat, not ethical conviction. Without a change in cultural mindset — from resistance to reconciliation — the Two-State Solution remains a diplomatic phrase, not a peace plan.
Summary Table of Core Insights
Era Dominant Idea Real Objective Outcome 1947 UN Partition Arab rejection 1948 War, no Palestine 1948–1967 Arab control of West Bank & Gaza No state created Focus on destroying Israel 1967 Arab war to erase Israel Israel’s victory Arab defeat; “return to 1967 borders” demand 1993–2000 Oslo peace efforts Two-State framework Collapsed amid terrorism & mistrust 2023–2025 Post–Oct 7 reality Disillusionment Two-State ideal politically dead
Conclusion
The historical record shows that Palestinian statehood has never been blocked by Israel alone — it has been repeatedly rejected, postponed, or undermined by the Arab side itself.
From 1948 through 1967, Arab rulers had every opportunity to create a state and did not. From 1993 onward, Palestinian leadership had opportunities for peace and squandered them through corruption, incitement, and terror.
The central issue was never the size of Israel — but the fact of Israel.
Until Palestinian identity reorients from denial to construction, and until Arab politics replaces resentment with responsibility, the “Two-State Solution” will remain what it has long been — a diplomatic mirage across a desert of rejection.